The great stalemate 264
We’ve written in the past about how rarely the vote in Scotland has any meaningful impact on the formation of the UK government, but the (first?) election of 2017 was one of those few occasions. Indeed, it could reasonably be argued that Scotland is mainly responsible for the complete mess that UK politics now finds itself in.
Had the seven seats won by Labour in Scotland gone to the Tories, Theresa May would have a working majority today (324 seats – taking out the Speaker and Sinn Fein MPs who don’t participate, the true threshold of majority is 322).
Conversely, had the 13 seats won by the Tories in Scotland gone to Labour OR (more plausibly) stayed with the SNP, Jeremy Corbyn would have been able to assemble a progressive alliance and form a government.
(Labour+SNP+Lib Dem would have added up to the required 322, with a cushion of five extra seats available from Plaid Cymru and the Greens. Readers who are – quite rightly – wary of considering the Lib Dems part of a progressive alliance should note that they wouldn’t be required to back Corbyn in this scenario, just not oppose him.)
It seems at the first glance, then, that a successful “stop the SNP” tactical voting campaign in Scotland bizarrely ensured that NEITHER the Tories nor Labour could form a stable UK government. (The Tories’ slapstick courting of the DUP looks set to produce the weakest administration since 1974. We see no way that another election this year can be avoided.)
But it didn’t happen quite as straightforwardly as that.




















