Weekend essay: The post-mortem and obituary of the positive case for the Union
If you’ve been reading this site for a while, you could be forgiven for thinking that the “positive case for the Union” was some sort of mythical beast, akin to the fabled unicorn. But that’s not quite the case. It did once exist, many moons ago, but has since become extinct – a victim of an ever-changing world where it was unable to compete and it couldn’t adapt to its new environment, thereby spelling its doom.
So just what was the positive case when it existed? Let’s find out.
We can break the benefits of the Union down into four strands; economic, military, political and social. Economic benefits were the driver for the creation of the Union (that and a little bribery), but over the intervening years between then and now, the world changed and new benefits accrued before they too were eventually lost.
Economic – in our recent look into the Darien Scheme we saw how access to trade was the main driver for Scotland joining a union with England. Without the Union, Scotland would have struggled against the protectionist measures of the British Empire (or English Empire as it would have been). Being part of the British Empire gave Scotland access to the commonwealth markets and allowed the Scottish to flourish both as traders and as empire builders in the civil service. This brought wealth and prosperity back to Scotland and was responsible for the large Scottish diaspora throughout the world.
Military – the exploits of the British military are world-renowned (either for good or for evil, but that’s a discussion for another day). After 1707 the world changed around the Union – it became increasingly apparent that with warring neighbours and expansionist European powers, there was strength to be had in unity. With dangerous neighbours out for themselves and hell-bent on taking what they wanted by force, the Union provided security that Scotland could rely upon, and the spending on defence in such a world was appropriate to the size of the threat.
This meant that Scotland benefited greatly in its shipyards and communities from the money spent on the military. The Scots did however pay a heavy price in blood as they bore the brunt of military action and participated to a disproportionate degree in imperial wars and in defence of these islands. (For instance, a full third of Nelson’s navy was in fact Scottish, and therefore probably not all that fussed by his famous exhortation “England expects that every man will do his duty”. See also the higher levels of military service in the Scottish population versus the UK average, which persist through to the modern day.)
Political – although originally based on military power, the political influence of the empire was also paramount in securing a stable trading environment for the Scottish merchants. With the might of the British military behind it, the Empire could mould smaller countries to its needs, and where necessary dominate them. This left Britain with strong bargaining positions during negotiations, and international politics became an easier game to win. Today Unionists call this a “strong voice on the world stage”, but it needs to be remembered that the 18th century was a time when only the strong would be listened to, so for Scotland the Union was a roundabout way of having some sort of voice abroad. In today’s United Nations world, the situation is rather different.
Social – the Union created a common purpose and drive that propelled the Scots nation to the forefront of the Industrial Revolution, and provided the culture from which we still (just about) benefit today. It gave opportunities for trade in not only goods, but in tastes, beliefs, language and social norms throughout the nations of the Union, and created the generally-harmonious state (in both senses of the word) in which we now live. This shared social bond saw the creation of the two NHSs (NHS Scotland, and NHS England/Wales/Northern Ireland) and the advent of the welfare state.
These ties bind us all throughout these lands, from the following of Premier League football and watching of the same TV programmes, through to the common pain felt at the loss of soldiers on duty or the sympathy felt towards the victims of tragedy anywhere on these islands. The social fabric has been woven deep, with the Union historically acting as the only thing preventing barriers from being raised again.
But as we’re about to see, these benefits are no longer the sole preserve of the Union, and would exist today regardless of whether the Union remained or not. So where did it all start to go wrong for the Union, and what were the events that started it on its long decline down the slippery slope to the real prospect of dissolution?
The Union saw its first signs of weakness as far back as the 1880s, with the rise of Irish nationalism. This led to the development of so called “Home Rule” bills, the first of which (in 1886) was defeated in the House of Commons, while the second (in 1893) was passed by the Commons but rejected by the House of Lords.
A third home rule bill was introduced in 1912 and finally passed by Westminster. It was intended to provide self-government for Ireland as part of a devolved framework within the United Kingdom – the Act was the first law ever passed by Westminster that sought to establish devolved government. But subsequent developments in Ireland led to postponements, ultimately meaning that the Act never took effect.
There was uproar in Ireland at the tagging-on of a military service bill to the Act, so that Home Rule was tied to service in the British military. The likelihood of enforced conscription created a backlash and outraged the Irish nationalist parties at Westminster, who walked out in protest and returned to Ireland to organise opposition.
Upon the breakout of the Great War in 1914, the Irish found themselves with an opportunity to take action while the British military was otherwise engaged. The Easter Rising was an insurrection staged during Easter week in 1916. It was mounted by Irish Republicans, who seized key locations in Dublin and proclaimed an Irish Republic independent of Britain. After seven days of fighting the rising was suppressed, and its leaders were court-martialled and executed. The impact on the Government at the time meant that they could not afford to ignore or delay on the subject of Home Rule any longer – a fact that was highlighted at the UK general election in 1918, when republicans won 73 seats out of 105 in Ireland.
In January 1919, the elected members of Sinn Féin who were not still in prison at the time issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and convened the first Dáil, establishing the Irish Republic. The British government refused to accept the legitimacy of the newly-declared nation and instead pressed ahead with a fourth home-rule bill. This led directly to the Irish War of Independence the same year, with a ceasefire only being declared in 1921.
Yet in the intervening years, the fourth home-rule bill continued its progress through Parliament and was eventually enacted as the Government of Ireland Act 1920. The post-ceasefire talks led to the December 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which ended British rule in most of Ireland, and after a ten-month transitional period overseen by a provisional government, the Irish Free State was established.
This was the first great schism to afflict the Union, although the impact of what would later become known as the First World War was also a great driver in showing the massive divide in power within it, with the poor relied on as cannon fodder for a war few at the time understood and would not have participated in were it not for national pride.
The (now slightly less-)United Kingdom ploughed on, despite what was effectively an amputation after the exit of (most of) the Irish. The implications were clear – the great empire was not impregnable and not all-powerful, a message that would reverberate around the globe. It wasn’t until after the Second World War, however, that the power of the British Empire – and by association the positive case for the Union – began to unravel.
The greater British state, aware of this threat to its continued unity, had already begun to deploy the rhetoric of fear against the various nationalist movements within its borders. In 1931, for example, Winston Churchill said of Indian independence:
“At present the Government of India is responsible to the British Parliament, which is the oldest, the least unwise and the most democratic parliament in the world. To transfer that responsibility to this highly artificial and restricted oligarchy of Indian politicians would be a retrograde act. It would be a shameful act. It would be an act of cowardice, desertion and dishonour. It would bring grave material evils, both upon India and Great Britain; but it would bring upon Great Britain a moral shame which would challenge for ever the reputation of the British Empire as a valiant and benignant force in the history of mankind.
“The faithful discharge of our duty in India is not only a cause, but a symbol. It is the touchstone of our fortunes in the present difficult time. If we cannot do our duty in India, be sure we shall have shown ourselves unworthy to preserve the vast empire which still centres upon this small island. The same spirit of unimaginative incompetence and weak compromise and supine drift will paralyse trade and business and prevent either financial reorganisation or economic resurgence.”
Churchill was right about being unable to preserve the vast Empire, as dominions began to break away after the end of the Second World War such as Rhodesia, Kenya and India. They employed varying methods, yet all were successful in achieving independence. It’s no coincidence that Unionists harp back to WW2 as a beacon for Britain – it’s because after 1945, the Britain they like to portray to the world no longer existed. The war had left the UK and the remains of its Empire facing a massive mountain of debt, and provided opportunities for more independence movements to take hold.
But the two world wars had other effects too. They’d united the world community of nations in determination to work together to ensure that such catastrophic events could never be allowed to happen again. It was to this end that global organisations were commissioned (building from the failure of the League Of Nations) to act as arbiters in the world of international politics, finance and trade. To this end, the concept of economic security in a liberal international economic system that enhanced the possibilities of post-war peace was created, in the form of the Bretton Woods system.
The link between economic stability and security was widely perceived by many – one of whom was Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State from 1933-44. Hull believed that the fundamental causes of the two world wars lay in economic discrimination and trade competition. Specifically, he had in mind the trade and exchange controls of Nazi Germany and the imperial-preference system practiced by Britain, by which members or former members of the British Empire were accorded special trade status (itself provoked by German, French, and American protectionist policies). Hull argued:
“Unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with war… if we could get a freer flow of trade… freer in the sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions… so that one country would not be deadly jealous of another and the living standards of all countries might rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a reasonable chance of lasting peace.”
Setting up a system of rules, institutions, and procedures to regulate the international monetary system, the planners at Bretton Woods established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which today is part of the World Bank Group. Although the United States unilaterally terminated convertibility of the dollar to gold on August 15th 1971, with the result being that the Bretton Woods system officially ended, the lasting effect was to set up the systems of international trade in currency and set the path for the world we live in today.
With the Bretton Woods system in place, the nations now turned their attention to the political interactions of the international community. Hold tight, readers, we’re going to zip you through all of this as swiftly as possible, in a one-stop reference guide to the creation of the modern world, or Everything You Ever Needed To Know About Earth But Couldn’t Get A Unionist To Tell You.
If you find yourself starting to flag at any point, just look at the unicorn-sex cartoon again for a few seconds until you calm down. You’ll be fine. You’re safe here.
The United Nations came into being in 1945. The UN’s stated aims were (and are) facilitating cooperation in international law, international security, economic development, social progress, human rights, and achievement of world peace. One of the first actions of the UN to have significant impact was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a multilateral agreement regulating international trade with the purpose of achieving “substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis”. It was signed in 1947, and remained in place until 1993 when it was replaced by the World Trade Organization.
The WTO deals with regulation of trade between participating countries. It provides a framework for negotiating and formalising and administering trade agreements, and a dispute-resolution process aimed at enforcing participants’ adherence to WTO agreements. Additionally, it is the WTO’s duty to review and propagate the national trade policies, and to ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through surveillance in global economic policy-making. Essentially it removed the protectionist measures of the age of empires and opened trade to free competition. The inherent benefits once provided by the Union, of a monopoly on trade, vanished into the modern world of global commerce.
Closer to home, further advances in integration and cooperation were undertaken as a result of the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 under the Treaty of Paris. The ECSC was first proposed by French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 as a way to prevent further war between France and Germany. He declared his aim was to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible”.
The Treaty was signed not only by France and West Germany but also by Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Between these states the ECSC would create a common market for coal and steel and act as the forerunner to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), now the European Union (EU).
The EU advanced this integration through the development of a single market through standardised laws which apply in all member states. Within the Schengen Area (which includes EU and non-EU states) passport controls have been abolished. EU policies aim to ensure the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital, enact legislation in justice and home affairs, and maintain common policies on trade, agriculture, fisheries and regional development. An alternative but related strand of organisation was developed in 1960 by Norway and Switzerland, with Iceland and Lichtenstein joining later; it became known as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
The EU and EFTA now worked together to create the European Economic Area. The European Economic Area (EEA) unites the 27 EU Member States and three EFTA States (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) into an internal market governed by the same basic rules. These rules aim to enable goods, services, capital, and persons to move freely about the EEA in an open and competitive environment, a concept referred to as the four freedoms.
In addition, the Agreement covers cooperation in other important areas such as research and development, education, social policy, the environment, consumer protection, tourism and culture, collectively known as “flanking and horizontal” policies. It guarantees equal rights and obligations within the internal market for citizens and economic operators in the EEA. This meant that membership of the EEA and not the Union became the necessary issue to ensure free trade and access to markets.
The UN, EU and EFTA have resulted in a shift from large nations dictating international politics and having the only effective voices, to the more common form of “flotilla” politics where small nations band together to lobby for common goals – constantly changing partners depending on the topic at hand, and amplifying the voice of small nations. It allows a small country like Scotland to always campaign in its own interests as even if it loses the argument, it gets its views across and can influence decisions to reduce negative impacts.
The UK as a whole also has to do the same thing in these international communities, so within the Union the Scottish voice is already diluted before the arguments even reach the supra-national body. The benefits of having a strong voice no longer reside with the Union, but out of it.
In addition to the trade benefits, the development of the EU, EFTA and the EEA brought about a stable European community that was so tightly interwoven as to make war between member states highly unlikely – the costs to any country had now become more than any benefits that could accrue from aggressive action. But further integration and consolidation was also achieved in response to the presence of threats from outside Europe. The Cold War helped to secure peace in the new community by forcing the member countries to forge an alliance with the USA against the threat of Soviet Russia. Its name was NATO.
NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed on 4 April 1949. The organization constitutes a system of collective defence whereby its member states agree to mutual defence in response to an attack on any member by any external party. The combined military spending of NATO members constitutes over 70% of the world’s defence spending, and members regularly interact and participate in joint projects and training. NATO requires that member states harbour nuclear weapons for the alliance and are trained in their deployment, even if the country involved has no nuclear deterrent of its own.
In addition to the 28 full NATO member countries there are also 22 countries participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union. This involves joint exercises, support and training, while allowing the countries involved to maintain their non-nuclear defence positions. This has provided unprecedented cooperation and support throughout the western world in military aspects and has meant that the West is, after the fall of Communism in the early 1990s, without a credible enemy threatening its borders.
The benefit of being tied to a large neighbour for mutual defence no longer holds sway as it is the alliance of many countries, some even smaller than Scotland, which now provides that stability. Whether Scotland contributes to that alliance via the Union or independently is of little consequence, as the outcome is the same in both instances.
As a small country on an island off the coast of this large and benign buffer zone, there is no credible military threat to Scotland anywhere on the planet. Gone are the days when an invasion force from overseas is a realistic prospect – terrorism has become the new scourge of the West, and tackling this requires international coordination and cooperation, not armies. (Indeed, it is more likely that a small non-aggressive country would attract less attention from terrorism than the UK government and its foreign interventionism.)
These organisations are now so familiar to us that we forget that they are only slightly more than half a century old, and in many cases much younger. Their combined effect was to usher in an age of globalisation and mutual cooperation in which supra-national bodies hold ever more power over the activities of states and the lives of their citizens.
Meanwhile, the UK has seen the advent of a politics of neoliberal “consensus”, which has been resoundingly rejected by the Scottish electorate, yet due to disparities in size between Scotland and England has been foisted upon the Scots anyway. The Thatcher years saw a massive loss of industry and jobs as the economy was rebalanced along ideological lines, using the money obtained through oil revenues to improve the economic outlook of the South East of England and its financial services sector to the detriment of the economy elsewhere in the UK.
The huge concentration of power in London and the surrounding area was only partly solved by the advent of devolution. The Scottish nation remains tied to the decisions of Westminster through the Barnett formula, whereby the funding of Scotland’s devolved functions is determined in relation to 80% of the funding given to England. Scotland is not in control of its own resources, reliant instead on a “block grant”, often characterised by nationalists as “pocket money”.
The radically-different modern world has impacted on the Union by removing the privileges and benefits it once offered in international trade, politics and defence. It’s opened up a more collegiate approach to international relations, where it’s no longer necessary to be a military superpower or major economic engine to have a say, thanks to the creation of enduring supra-national bodies. Membership of the Union does not bring Scotland any inherent economic advantages in today’s world, a fact picked up nearly four decades ago in the infamously-suppressed McCrone report:
“Membership of the EEC affects the economics of Scottish independence in several important respects. It guarantees access to English and Continental markets in a way which would not be possible otherwise. Without EEC Scotland would always run the risk that England might find it expedient to impose an import surcharge, a quantitative control or even a tariff on goods coming from Scotland. It was largely to eliminate this that Scotland accepted the Union of 1707.
“New EEC rules would have the same effect and for all nine member states. In the unlikely event of England leaving the EEC, Scottish access to the other countries could in time largely compensate for any restrictions that might arise on English trade.
“Access to EEC should also help to provide a major stimulus to Scottish industrial investment. The EEC is not only a bigger market than the UK but its economy has been much more buoyant than that of Britain. There is no doubt that the exclusion of the United Kingdom had a damaging effect on investment and that foreign firms in particular preferred development within EEC. To gain the full advantage of this stimulus from membership it will, of course, be necessary to have a stable domestic economy. High rates of inflation and a declining currency such as the UK has had recently would do much to discourage foreign companies from coming to Scotland.
“North Sea oil could have far-reaching consequences for Scottish membership of EEC because of the tremendously increased political power it would confer. Without oil other members might pay little enough regard to Scotland; her voting power would not be large and it might indeed be argued that she could exert more leverage on the Community as part of the United Kingdom. As the major producer of oil in Western Europe, however, Scotland would be in a key position and other countries would be extremely foolish if they did not seek to do all they could to accommodate Scottish interests.
“For Scotland the net cost of Common Agricultural Policy, which features so large in British discussions would be at most some £40m a year, a small sum compared with the balance of payments gain from North Sea oil. The more common policies come to be decided in Brussels in the years ahead, the more Scotland would benefit from having her own Commissioner in the EEC as of right and her own voice in the Council of Ministers instead of relying on the indirect, and so far hardly satisfactory, form of vicarious representation through UK departments.”
On a social level, we still speak the same language, we can still enjoy the same TV shows and through the advent of modern technology we can remain in communication better than ever before. The end of the political union will have no bearing on the social union – for instance, there are no border posts between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (the UK), so as long as Scotland remains outside of the Schengen agreement and remains within the British Isles Travel Zone then the fabric of the social union will remain untouched regardless of the status of the political union.
All that leaves the positive case for the Union with is sentiment, and if sentiment is all that’s left of the “positive case for the Union” then it no longer has any relevance to the present day. The Union benefits of the past are more than outweighed by the democratic and economic deficiencies of the current Westminster cabal, of all three main parties.
The UK Government is acting as the living embodiment of Churchill’s statement that the “spirit of unimaginative incompetence and weak compromise and supine drift will paralyse trade and business and prevent either financial reorganisation or economic resurgence”.
The positive case for the Union existed until the end of empire and the advent of the modern age. Its funeral may be held in autumn 2014. Its children, though, will survive.
Good article Scott, but i’m not convinced that ‘prosperity’ led to the Scottish diaspora.
I would think the ‘clearances’ and poverty played a bigger part?
I’m a bit hazy what the electoral map is supposed to represent. It’s not an actual election result as far as I can see.
Stuart,
Excellent piece. On the principle that it would be churlish to criticise someone who has put such effort into producing such a well-conceived argument could I instead offer a few supplementary points by way of fleshing out some of the detail of the general observations that you provide here.
The main reason that the US (White) plan rather than Keynes’s British plan prevailed in the Breton Woods negotiations was that, at the end of WWII, given the huge costs of reconstruction of the major war-torn economies of Western Europe, there was only one country in 1945 that was equipped to supply capital goods, consumer goods and, of course, dollars to the rest of the world, and that was the US. What Keynes understood was that the US plan for Bretton Woods put the burden of adjustment on deficit countries like Britain. Surplus countries like the US, and later Germany and Japan, could simply accumulate their surpluses, thus exacerbating global imbalances. Hence the perennial French complaint about Bretton Woods that it allowed the US to live beyond its means, safe in the knowledge that there was a plentiful demand for dollars across the world which the US was only too happy to supply.
It’s also important to acknowledge that, in spite of what you say about GATT, Bretton Woods was characterised by the implementation of effective capital controls. This was not the world that we have been familiar with since 1973, where capital markets, since that time, have been able to hold countries to ransom. This is one reason why economists say that ‘Keynesianism’ works more effectively in a ‘closed’ or rather, less ‘open’ national economy. Having said that, we know that as early as 1966-67 capital markets were strong enough to threaten capital flight from Britain on the fear that sterling was going to be devalued within Bretton Woods. This unfortunate situation was mismanaged by the Labour government of the day, not for the first time and, as we know, certainly not the last.
This system worked reasonably well until the Americans started to incur trade deficits in the 1960s. An early response was the ‘Gold Pool’ in the 1960s, where the US attempted to end the practice of what was, in effect, central bank arbitrage (the French were regular culprits). Under Bretton Woods, the US Treasury guaranteed a price of $35 an ounce to central banks. What the banks were able to do, before the ‘Gold Pool’ agreement, was to buy gold from the US Treasury at $35 an ounce and sell it in the open market in London at $40 an ounce. Given that Bretton Woods was a dollar-gold standard, this arbitrage needed urgent attention from the US. But it was the consequences of US trade deficits, exacerbated but not caused by the costs of the Vietnam war that led Nixon eventually to close the ‘gold window’ in 1971.
By this time, sterling was already well into its secular decline. The British had began the twentieth century with sterling as the world’s reserve currency. They had started the post-war period still, just about, credibly able to claim that, under Bretton Woods, sterling – supported by the ‘sterling area’ – was the world’s second reserve currency. They had ended the Bretton Woods system, which sterling left in June 1972, with no credible exchange rate policy, a national economy that was in crisis and a currency that was about to be the victim of the newly empowered capital markets (after the eventual collapse of the Smithsonian agreement in 1973).
Since then, the British have been conducting crisis management throughout the last four decades . Fast forward to today and those crazy wide-eyed English Tory eurosceptics at Westminster who, astonishingly, would like nothing more than to see the collapse of the Eurozone and every European country adopt its own currency. If this happened it would simply create a fallacy of composition whereby the English/British would lose the only monetary advantages they have over EU countries at present, that is, the competitive devaluation of sterling and quantitative easing.
You can illustrate the principle of the fallacy of composition with a simple example. Suppose you’re at a football match. There’s a capacity crowd and everyone is sitting down. The problem is, you can’t see the match. So, to get a better view, you stand up. If, for the duration of the match, you’re the only one standing, there’s no problem. But now the people behind you can’t see, so they stand up, and the people behind them stand up and so on. Eventually, the only people still sitting, and the only ones who can see the match, are the people in the front rows. At the moment, in the EU, the British are the only ones ‘standing up’ so to speak. But if the Eurozone disintegrates and all other countries adopt their own currency then they, too, will ‘stand up’ and join in the ‘match’ of competitive devaluation and national quantitative easing with the result that the British will lose the only advantage they have at present over the Eurozone countries.
For what it’s worth, I would like to see Scotland adopt its own currency but, unfortunately, that would take time. It’s not just a matter of setting up a central bank and regulating the domestic relationship between the central bank and the commercial banks. But an independent Scotland would have the requisite institutional depth and the regulatory power and capacity to make it work. With its present banking system as well as the precedents set by other small countries, it could easily manage the necessary reserve requirements, backed up with its broad economic base, north sea oil assets and, of course, renewable potential. The trick will be how to best, after independence, negotiate the period of inevitable uncertainty that would exist between the prevailing currency system and the adoption of a Scottish ‘poond’ or whatever.
Incidentally, you missed out the important point that the UN Charter legitimated the self-determination of small countries in particular and this was given further impetus after 1989 when the former Soviet satellites won their independence. I also think that the ill-fated British invasion of Egypt in 1956 (or what the English quaintly refer to as ‘the Suez crisis’) merited attention, particularly given the role of the US, though a similar tale could be told about the influence of US hegemony on British decolonisation and what is referred to as ‘British’ foreign policy in the post-war period up to the present. All things considered, and looking at the likely trajectory of Scotland’s economy if it remains in the union, the question is not so much can Scotland afford independence but, rather, can we afford not to become independent? But there’s an A star heading in your direction.
Apologies Scott, the A star has been duly re-directed!
@Juteman – I take on board the Clearances and you are right. But the Diaspora was also assisted by scots willingly going abroad to service the empire, sending trade home. Whether or not you can say that this was a benefit to scotland or not is debatable.
@YesYesYes – Excellent contribution. The aim I was going for was to try and show how alterations in geo-politics have changed the world we live in today. You were right that Bretton woods was not the end but I did try to allude to that when stating:
“the United States unilaterally terminated convertibility of the dollar to gold on August 15th 1971, with the result being that the Bretton Woods system officially ended”
The rest of your post was very infomative, thank you.
@Morag – The map is that of the 2011 election results for constituencies and the corresponding SNP landlide. There was a reference to this in the article but it was edited out by RevStu – So I guess the map could go since it doesnt reference anything anymore.
It represents the democratic deficit…
Stunning article, Scott. I would say it only tells half the story, though. You’re quite right that unionists hark back to the second world war as this was the last time you could semi-credibly say that the union allowed Scotland and England to stand together to fight a common enemy (and even then it ignores the fact that non-Empire countries fought alongside us), and to go back to more recent examples disprove their point, as we then have the UN and other agencies binding countries together.
But they also sometimes hark back to the 1945 – 51 period, and the creation of the welfare state (which you do in fact touch upon), and this, I would say, is the other half of the story. I think you could essentially call the two halves the “international” argument and the “domestic” argument. The international argument relies upon people accepting the false premise that the world today is in some way comparable to the world before 1945, when there were credible risks to countries in the Western world. Invoking the “defence” argument requires people to ignore the fact that no country involved in most of these pacts has ever been the victim of invading forces. One-off acts of terrorism perhaps, but nothing to the extent of which puts a nation’s very existence at threat. You have to look towards Africa and the Middle East for current day examples of this, or Latin and Central America throughout the 70s and 80s. In fact, the only defence policy any nation really needs is “don’t become a US target.”
The international argument is almost the “paternal” argument, and thus the domestic argument can be characterised as the “maternal” argument. While the international argument sees the union protecting us from harm by outside forces, the domestic argument sees the union nurturing us, through the welfare system, nationalised health, schooling and shelter. But again, this relies on people ignoring the fact that the past 30-odd years (if not longer) have seen all these arguments diminish, if indeed they ever really applied at all. Devolution, and the emergence of the SNP government in particular, has seen these arguments blown out of the water, to the extent that only the most blind will not see. With devolution allowing Scotland to take a different path on most social issues, the differences between Scotland and England are stark, and we can easily point to welfare and pensions and say “we would be doing that differently too if we had the powers…”
That paternal/maternal split doesn’t work completely of course, although it might go some way to explaining why the unionist argument is so macho – after all, I think even us men recognise that we’re more touchy than women when we think people are questioning our relevance and position. In this respect, Trident is essentially the union’s manhood. Hmmm, suddenly I feel I’ve read one too many feminist rants on Better Nation…
Anyway, that’s all beside the point, because I think the intent of your essay was to focus on the international aspect anyway, which you have done fantastically. A long read, but absolutely worth it.
@Morag – The map is that of the 2011 election results for constituencies and the corresponding SNP landlide. There was a reference to this in the article but it was edited out by RevStu – So I guess the map could go since it doesnt reference anything anymore.
Scott, no it isn’t. There is (at least) one constituency credited to the Conservatives which actually went Labour. That’s why I was querying it, because it’s a big blotch of red that’s missing. Here’s a link to the correct map on the BBC.
link to bbc.co.uk
Yes I know it’s the BBC but it is correct. Here’s the same thing on Wikipedia.
link to en.wikipedia.org
Read as much as I could,and I consider my self really average,I struggled to read it all,and some of the follow on comments,went way past my ken.But as an average Scotsman I’d say get it out there to the majority, but to have most of us ordinary guys read and understand it needs to be shorter and simplified.Having a few read it and understand is not good enough for a lot of effort and some really fine writing.Maybe I’m criticising but that is not what I mean to do,I mean to compliment you,and remind you not all of us had good English teachers,mine was crap,well junior secondary teachers were in the most rubbish and they passed on their rubbish to the pupils.
Charles, I think you have a case for making a truncated version of this, because it really is worth getting this info out to people, and we all know the media won’t do it. Putting it into bullet-points, or a series of smaller posts, or something like that. Or maybe even just a timeline of events.
A lot of people don’t understand this sort of stuff, and are unlikely to go out of their way to find it out for themselves. An unfortunate position, but true nonetheless…
Scott
Chapeau bas.
BtP
Most the “benefits” of the union can basically be summed up as submission to a bully or gangster and the subsequent lessening of the harassment, threats and violence from the bully now that it has its neighbourhood under the thumb and turns its eye elsewhere. Hardly something to be proud or pleased about. The late era great “boons” of the NHS, etc. could all have happened without the union (other countries in the world have welfare systems and health care too, without having to submit to Westminster rule) and indeed now we see them all under threat by that very same union.
If anything it’s likely that without the union millstone forced upon us and the constant hostility of the mad dog neighbour England (directed at Scotland until it was bullied into submission and then directed everywhere else in the world and a sliver of that madness still carries on today) that Scotland would have bloomed to a far greater extent, culturally, socially and economically (as all too often Westminster was more a hinderance than a help to these factors as the SE of England was all that mattered). Certainly this would be the case in the post war world.
A wife shouldn’t be told to be grateful or consider it a great boon when the husband stops beating her so much as he used to.
Ooh, a good read. I like reading this kind of stuff, it’s really informative =).
@Scott Minto
The UN, EU and EFTA have resulted in a shift from large nations dictating international politics and having the only effective voices, to the more common form of “flotilla” politics
The veto in the UN by the P5 ensures the partial falsity of this assertion. And the UN hardly stopped Iraq from being invaded due to two of the P5 wanting to get a cut of oil revenues.
I first became aware of how undemocratic the EU was back in the mid/late eighties. Despite having taken an active part in a Europe wide campaign, which did eventually achieve its goal, it turned out it was only a temporary victory. The grievance successfully campaigned against returned to its original course exactly a year later. This, despite the European Parliament having voted for it to be shelved full stop. In other words ‘flotilla politics’ gets lip service and then its Brussels business as normal.
…WTO’s duty to review and propagate the national trade policies, and to ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through surveillance in global economic policy-making.
The Scottish government’s cynical opportunism at Norway’s misfortune re salmon trade, undermines this assertion somewhat. So far hee haw has been done regarding China’s contempt for the WTO when it feels slighted by Nobel Peace Prize awarding countries. Witness the Norwegian salmon allowed to rot in Chinese warehouses. Could even be argued that Mr Salmond’s government is being seen to support political oppression and part undermine the authority of the WTO.
Membership of the Union does not bring Scotland any inherent economic advantages in today’s world, a fact picked up nearly four decades ago in the infamously-suppressed McCrone report:
Nicely selective (as all sides do of course) McCrone report passage. How about this bit:
“Even with greater diversification of Scottish trade to Europe and to North America, an impoverished England or one perpetually suffering the rigours of demand restraint would have most serious consequences for the Scottish economy.”
It’s the one true worry I have about independence.
All that leaves the positive case for the Union with is sentiment,
It’s sentiment that makes the Scottish Whisky industry as powerful, rich and successful as it is. If you think people vote with their heads you’re being naive or disingenuous.
Nice (overly long) piece, but I’d rather you turned your talent for this kind of polemicising to telling people like me why independence, secession, separation, whatever you want to call it, is going to result in a ‘velvet’ divorce.
If I believed we’d get a velvet divorce I’d vote for independence tomorrow.
The more fractious the ‘debate’ inevitably becomes the more it becomes polarised and a real turn off.
From where I’m standing, both sides are just as crap as the other.
“The more fractious the ‘debate’ inevitably becomes the more it becomes polarised and a real turn off.”
Quick question: do you imagine your blog is a constructive contribution?
Thanks Scott for spending the time (which must have been considerable) to put together this informative and well written piece.
Is Longshanker not Braveheart in another disguise or, are they in any way related?
I don’t think so – Cllr Gallagher is a fair bit stupider.
Thanks
@Rev Stu
“Quick question: do you imagine your blog is a constructive contribution?”
It’s as constructive as Mr Salmond’s Sunday Sun Day of Destiny cover.
Your civic replies to my initial comments on this pseudo-political site inspired the idea of blogging – you clearly know what you’re doing.
The Day of Ignominy Cover was the final push however. As a Scot living in Scotland, I genuinely felt insulted by that cover.